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We assess the extent to which the period of great U.S. macroeconomic stability 
since the mid-1980s can be accounted for by changes in oil shocks and the oil 
share in GDP. To do this we estimate a DSGE model with an oil-producing sec-
tor before and after 1984 and perform counterfactual simulations. We nest two 
popular explanations for the Great Moderation: (1) smaller (non-oil) real shocks; 
and (2) better monetary policy. We ﬁ  nd that the reduced oil share accounted for 
as much as one-third of the inﬂ  ation moderation and 13% of the growth mod-
eration, while smaller oil shocks accounted for 11% of the inﬂ  ation moderation 
and 7% of the growth moderation. This notwithstanding, better monetary policy 
explains the bulk of the inﬂ  ation moderation, while most of the growth modera-
tion is explained by smaller TFP shocks.
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Hamilton (1983) noticed that all US recessions but one since World War II were
preceded by increases in the price of crude oil, suggesting that exogenous oil
shocks were responsible for much of the post war volatility of US GDP growth
(see Figure 1). Other authors found similar evidence of a link between oil price
rises and US in￿ ation, as well as a link between oil price ￿ uctuations and both
output growth and in￿ ation in other industrialized countries (e.g. Darby (1982),
Burbidge and Harrison (1984)).
The relevance of oil as a source of macroeconomic ￿ uctuations was estab-
lished as conventional wisdom at least until Hooker (1999) pointed to a break in
the oil price￿ GDP relationship and Hooker (2002) found a parallel break in the
oil price￿ in￿ ation relationship around 1981.1 This break date roughly coincides
with (but precedes) the beginning of a period of remarkable macroeconomic
stability, dubbed by some economists as the ￿Great Moderation,￿ and re￿ ected
in a sharp decline in the volatility (and sometimes the persistence) of key macro
variables in a number of industrialized economies, including the US (see Table
1 and ￿gures 2 and 3).2
Since evidence suggests that the moderation is spread across a number of
countries3, and oil supply shocks are likely to a⁄ect many oil-importing countries
in a similar way, a reduction in oil sector volatility or a dampening of the
transmission of that volatility to the rest of the world economy is a natural
candidate (perhaps working alongside other factors) for explaining the rise of
macroeconomic stability in the advanced world. One possibility is that oil supply
shocks have simply become smaller or less frequent in the period after 1984; at
the same time, diversi￿cation towards less oil-intensive sectors and increased
energy e¢ ciency may have reduced the share of oil in GDP and thus diminished
the importance of oil supply shocks.
We assess the extent to which the macroeconomic moderation in the US
can be accounted for by changes in oil shocks and the oil share, by performing
counterfactual simulations based on Bayesian estimation of the model of Nakov
and Pescatori (2007) for the periods pre- and post-1984. In doing so, we nest
two popular explanations for the Great Moderation: (1) ￿good luck￿ in the
form of a shift in the distribution of TFP and other (non-oil) real shocks, as
claimed for example by Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2002) and Stock and Watson
(2002); and (2) an improvement in the conduct of monetary policy, as argued
1Speci￿cally, Hooker (1999) found that two widely used transformations of the oil price do
not Granger cause output in the post-1980 period, while Hooker (2002) identi￿ed a structural
break in core US in￿ation Phillips curves such that oil prices contributed substantially to core
in￿ation before 1981, but since that time the pass-through has been negligible.
2The ￿Great Moderation￿ was noticed by Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and
Perez-Quiros (2000), and its beginning is usually dated around 1984.
3Cecchetti et al. (2006) ￿nd evidence of moderation in 16 out of 25 industrialized countries,
and Stock and Watson (2003) report similar evidence for 6 of the G-7 countries; on the other
hand, see Canova et al. (2007) for evidence that the moderation has been more of an Anglo-
Saxon phenomenon.
2by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) and Boivin and Giannoni (2003).4
We ￿nd that oil played a non-trivial role in the moderation. In particular,
the reduction of the oil share alone can explain around one-third of the in￿ ation
moderation and 13% of the GDP growth moderation. In turn, oil- sector shocks
alone can account for 7% of the growth moderation and 11% of the in￿ ation
moderation. Yet the dominant role was played by non-oil shocks and by mon-
etary policy. In particular, smaller TFP shocks account for two-thirds of GDP
growth moderation, while better monetary policy alone can explain two-thirds
of the in￿ ation moderation.
Related to this, we ￿nd evidence that the in￿ ation￿ output gap trade-o⁄ has
become more benign after 1984 due to the smaller share of oil in GDP. More
generally, oil sector shocks have become less important for US macroeconomic
￿ uctuations relative to US-originating shocks to TFP, preferences and policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section puts our
work in the context of the related literature; section 3 presents the stylized
volatility facts; section 4 sketches a log-linearized version of the oil pricing model
of Nakov and Pescatori (2007) and illustrates how di⁄erent factors could cause
moderation; section 5 covers the data and estimation methodology; section 6
describes our priors and the estimation results; section 7 contains counterfactual
analysis decomposing the volatility moderation into contributions by each factor
and discusses the implied changes in the Phillips curve; section 8 relates our
results to those of the literature and the last section concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to several distinct lines of research. One is the empirical
literature on the link between oil and the macroeconomy starting with Darby
(1982) and Hamilton (1983). Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) challenged
Hamilton￿ s ￿nding, documenting that essentially all U.S. recessions in the post-
war period were preceded by both oil price increases as well as a tightening of
monetary policy. Using a modi￿ed VAR methodology, they found that the sys-
tematic monetary policy response to in￿ ation (presumably caused by oil price
increases) accounted for the bulk of the depressing e⁄ects of oil price shocks
on the real economy. What is more, Barsky and Killian (2001) and Killian
(2005) argued that even the major oil price increases in the 1970s were not an
essential part of the mechanism that generated stag￿ ation, and that the latter
is attributable instead to monetary factors. Unlike these studies, our analysis
is based on a structural model featuring optimal oil price setting, estimated
with Bayesian methods. This allows us to disentangle the contribution of policy
from the e⁄ects of oil shocks and the oil share without running into the Lucas
critique.
4We do not control for other possible explanations involving structural changes in private
sector behavior, such as better inventory management (McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000),
or ￿nancial innovation (Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel, 2005).
3Another strand of research deals with theoretical models of the link between
oil and the macroeconomy. Some of the more recent contributions include Kim
and Loungani (1992), Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), Finn (1995, 2000),
Leduc and Sill (2004), and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005). While these studies
di⁄er in the way oil is employed in the economy (as a consumption good, as a
standard productive input, or as a factor linked to capital utilization), and hence
in the implications of oil shocks, they all share the assumption that the oil price
(or oil supply) is exogenous, and hence unrelated to any economic fundamentals.
This is not only unappealing from a theoretical point of view as Killian (2007)
pointed out, it is also inconsistent with the evidence presented in Killian (2007),
Mabro (1998), and Hamilton (1983).5 The issue is that with an exogenous (or
a perfectly competitive) oil sector, and absent any real rigidities (e.g. real
wage rigidities as in Blanchard and Gali, 2007), there is no meaningful trade-o⁄
between in￿ ation and output gap stabilization, implying that full price stability
is optimal even in the face of oil sector shocks. The fact that in￿ ation in the
1970s was highly volatile suggests that either policy was very far from optimal,
or that indeed there was an important policy trade-o⁄. In contrast to existing
models, ours features a dominant oil exporter that charges an endogenously
varying (optimal) oil price markup, which enters the Phillips curve as a ￿cost-
push￿term and induces a trade-o⁄between the output gap and in￿ ation (Nakov
and Pescatori, 2007).
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on the Great Moderation, start-
ing with Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000). With some
simpli￿cation, most of the explanations for the stability can be classi￿ed into
three broad categories: (a) ￿good practices,￿ that is, changes in private sector
behavior unrelated to stabilization policy, for instance improved inventory man-
agement (McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000) or ￿nancial innovation (Dynan,
Elmendorf and Sichel, 2005); (b) ￿good policy,￿ notably better monetary policy
as argued by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), Boivin and Giannoni (2003), and
Gali and Gambetti (2007); and (c) ￿good luck,￿ meaning a favorable shift in the
distribution of real shocks, as in Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2002), Stock and
Watson (2002), and Justiniano and Primiceri (2006). Explanations of ￿good
luck￿in particular often give smaller oil shocks as an example (e.g., Summers,
2005).6
Our framework allows us to separate oil from non-oil factors, while nesting
the ￿better policy￿and ￿smaller non-oil shocks￿explanations. In this regard,
our work is most closely related to Leduc and Sill (2007), who assess the role
played by monetary policy relative to TFP and oil shocks in the Great Moder-
ation. The main advantage of our approach lies in modeling the oil sector from
5When testing the null hypothesis that the oil price is not Granger-caused collectively
by US output, unemployment, in￿ation, wages, money, and import prices, Hamilton (1983)
obtained a rejection at the 6% signi￿cance level.
6Not all studies ￿t the above classi￿cation. For example, Canova et al. (2007) claim that
it is impossible to account for both the Great In￿ation of the 1970s and the strong output
growth in the 1990s with a single explanation. Using a di⁄erent approach, Canova (2007)
￿nds that the fall in variances of output and in￿ation had di⁄erent causes, and that the quest
for a single explanation is likely misplaced. See section 8 for more on this.
4optimizing ￿rst principles rather than assuming an exogenous process for the oil
supply. Another di⁄erence is that we estimate most of the model￿ s parameters
separately for each sample with Bayesian techniques, which allows us to ￿t the
volatility reduction facts better compared to Leduc and Sill, who calibrate their
model. In addition, compared to their paper, we put special focus on the role
played by the oil share and not only on oil shocks.
3 Volatility Reduction Facts
Table 1 shows the standard deviations of three quarterly US macro series: GDP
growth, de￿ ator in￿ ation, and the federal funds rate, for two subsamples, pre-
and post-1984. ￿The Great Moderation￿ refers to the pronounced decline in
the volatility of these (and other) macro variables in the post-1984 sample. In
particular, the volatility of GDP growth declined by about 55%, in￿ ation by
60%, and the nominal interest rate by 30%. For comparison, the last row of
the table shows the standard deviation of the quarterly percentage change in
the real price of oil. While there is a reduction in its volatility by 20%, this is
somewhat less pronounced than for the other three variables.
Clearly, the volatility reduction facts reported in Table 1 are not insensitive
to the choice of break year. Di⁄erent studies have estimated di⁄erent break
dates for the di⁄erent variables, but usually they lie in the range around 1982
to 1986. Redoing the calculations with 1982:I as the break date, we obtain
volatility reductions of 45%, 57%, 20%, and 25%, respectively. And doing the
same with 1986:I, we obtained 54%, 62%, 36%, and 13%. While the di⁄erences
are nontrivial, by and large all three sample splits tell the same story.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate empirically the contribution of oil sector
volatility and transmission, and compare it with alternative explanations for the
volatility reduction (better monetary policy and non-oil-related ￿good luck￿ ).
While the Great Moderation is sometimes associated also with a reduction in
the persistence of macro variables (e.g., Canova et al. 2007), we will not attempt
to replicate this phenomenon or attribute it to the various factors.
Standard deviation (x 100) Volatility
1965:I ￿1983:IV 1984:I ￿2006:IV reduction
GDP growth 1.126 0.508 55%
In￿ ation 0.609 0.244 60%
Interest rate 0.847 0.583 31%
Real oil price 16.33 12.99 20%
Table 1. US volatility reduction since 1984
54 The Log-Linearized Model
We base our empirical analysis on the full version of the model in Nakov and
Pescatori (2007), outlined for convenience in the Appendix. Here we sketch a
compact representation of the more important equations, expressed in terms
of log-deviations from the e¢ cient equilibrium. For equal treatment of the
household sector with four other types of agents (￿rms, the monetary authority,
OPEC, and non-OPEC countries), we include a shock to the time discount factor
as an additional source of aggregate demand disturbance. In addition, we allow
for monetary policy to react to the output gap as well as in￿ ation, which in our
model is an appropriate objective for a central bank concerned with the welfare
of the representative household.
With these modi￿cations we are able to match the volatility facts reported in
Table 1 without the need to introduce additional features such as habit forma-
tion or price indexation. As explained below, the optimal commitment solution
of our model entails su¢ cient history-dependence to account for the sluggishness
of in￿ ation and output.
4.1 The Dynamic IS curve
Log-linearizing the consumer￿ s Euler equation, replacing consumption with the
value added of ￿nal goods (that is, GDP), and casting the resulting expression
in deviation from the e¢ cient allocation, we obtain
^ yt = Et^ yt+1 ￿ (^ {t ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿ ^ rr
e
t); (1)
where ^ yt = yt ￿ ye
t is the (log) distance between actual value added and its
e¢ cient level (which we refer to it as the ￿output gap￿for simplicity).
The IS curve thus relates the current output gap positively to its expected
future level, and negatively to the distance between the ex-ante real interest
rate ^ {t ￿ Et￿t+1, and the e¢ cient real interest rate, ^ rr
e
t. The latter is de￿ned















which depends negatively on shocks to technology, ^ at (in ￿nal goods) and ^ zt (in
the oil sector), and positively on the shock to the discount factor, ^ bt, where so
is the share of oil in GDP.7 The driving variables ^ at; ^ zt; and ^ bt are assumed to
follow independent stationary AR(1) processes
^ at = ￿a^ at￿1 + ￿a
t; (3)
^ zt = ￿z^ zt￿1 + ￿z
t; (4)
^ bt = ￿b^ bt￿1 + ￿b
t; (5)
7In the notation of Nakov and Pescatori (2007), so ￿ 1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2:
6where
^ at ￿ log(At); (6)
^ zt ￿ log(Zt); (7)
^ bt ￿ log(￿t) ￿ log(￿): (8)




innovations to US total factor productivity, oil technology, and the time discount
factor, all of them mean zero and with standard deviations ￿a; ￿z; and ￿b,
respectively.
Notice that the observable GDP growth rate is given by
￿yt = ￿^ yt + ￿ye
t: (9)
4.2 The Phillips curve
Aggregating the optimal staggered price-setting decision of ￿nal goods ￿rms,
we obtain the following ￿rst-order approximation to the dynamics of in￿ ation
around the deterministic steady-state with zero in￿ ation
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + (1 ￿ so)￿^ yt + so￿^ ￿t; (10)
where ￿t denotes in￿ ation, ^ yt is the output gap, ^ ￿t ￿ ^ pot + ^ zt is the optimal
oil price markup (determined below), ￿ is the mean time discount factor; and
parameter ￿ is related to the structural parameters of the underlying model as
follows
￿ =
(1 +  )(￿ ￿ so)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
[￿￿1 + (￿ ￿ 1)(1 +  )so]￿
; (11)
where   is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity, ￿ is the average
markup in the ￿nal goods sector, 1￿￿ is the frequency of price adjustment, and
￿1 is the labor share in ￿nal goods production.
Notice that the oil price markup enters the Phillips curve like a ￿cost-push￿
term. Namely, a rise in the oil price markup leads to a rise in in￿ ation and/or
a negative output gap, implying a trade-o⁄ between the two policy objectives.
This contrasts with the case of perfect competition in the oil sector (or an
exogenous oil price), in which oil price shifts are necessarily associated with an
opposite movement in the e¢ cient level of output and imply no tension between
in￿ ation and output gap stabilization (for more details we refer the reader to
Nakov and Pescatori, 2007).





kEt [(1 ￿ so)^ yt+k + so^ ￿t+k]; (12)
which shows that in￿ ation is a weighted average of current and expected future
output gaps and oil price markups.
74.3 Monetary policy
The central bank follows a Taylor-type rule of the form
^ {t = ￿i^ {t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)(￿￿￿t + ￿y^ yt) + ^ rt; (13)
where ￿t is in￿ ation, ^ yt is the output gap, ^ rt is a zero mean i:i:d: monetary
policy shock, and ￿i; ￿￿, and ￿y are policy reaction coe¢ cients.
4.4 Oil sector
Nakov and Pescatori (2007) model OPEC as the dominant supplier of oil, which
seeks to maximize the welfare of its owner, internalizing the e⁄ect of its pricing
decision on global output and oil demand. Operating alongside a competitive
fringe of price-taking oil suppliers, the dominant oil exporter sells its output
to an oil-importing country (the United States), which uses it to produce ￿nal
goods.
A ￿rst-order approximation of the optimal oil price-setting rule of the dom-
inant oil supplier takes the form













where ^ ￿t =
h
^ at;^ bt; ^ rt; ^ zt; ^ !t
i0
is a vector of exogenous states, and ￿ is a vector
of nonlinear functions of the structural parameters of the model. Notice that
while the behavior of households and ￿rms of the oil importer is fully forward-
looking in the model, the optimal commitment solution of OPEC￿ s problem is
history-dependent. In particular, it is a function of past value added, ^ yt￿1, and
the nominal interest rate, ^ {t￿1, both of which are state variables; in addition, it
depends on past promises about future oil supply, captured by the vector ^ ￿t￿1
of Lagrange multipliers.
Competitive fringe producers seek to maximize pro￿ts while taking the oil
price as given. In equilibrium, competitive fringe output, ^ xt, is an increasing
function of the oil price, ^ pot, oil technology, ^ zt, and the shock to fringe capacity,
^ !t
^ xt = ^ pot + ^ zt + ^ !t: (15)
The total capacity of the competitive fringe is assumed to follow a stationary
AR(1) process with persistence ￿!
^ !t = ￿!^ !t + ￿!
t ; (16)





t is i:i:d: with mean zero and standard deviation
￿!:
84.5 What factors could cause moderation?
We illustrate how di⁄erent factors may contribute to the moderation of di⁄erent
variables based on the above model.
Perhaps the simplest explanation could be that the distribution of real dis-
turbances hitting the economy has changed so that real shocks have become
smaller. Notice that smaller real shocks would reduce the volatility of ^ rr
e
t,
while smaller oil-sector shocks in particular are likely to diminish the variance
of the oil price markup, ^ ￿t. Since these are the two driving variables in our
model, for any given interest rate rule and oil share, the volatility of output,
in￿ ation, and the interest rate would be reduced.
An alternative (or complementary) explanation has to do with better mon-
etary policy. This includes smaller monetary surprises (^ rt shocks), as well as
a more stabilizing policy rule. Smaller monetary shocks reduce the volatility
of the interest rate, which is transmitted through the IS and Phillips curves to
actual output and in￿ ation. At the same time, stronger systematic reaction of
the policy instrument to in￿ ation and output deviations from target results in
better stabilization of these variables over the cycle.8
Finally, part of the moderation may be due to the fact that oil ￿ perhaps
once an important source of volatility ￿ now accounts for a smaller fraction of
GDP than in the past. The latter can be due to increased energy e¢ ciency and
diversi￿cation away from oil-intensive sectors.
The oil share a⁄ects the volatility of ^ rr
e
t as well as the coe¢ cient on the
cost-push term in the Phillips curve. Other things equal, a smaller oil share is
likely to reduce the volatility of output and the pass-through from the oil price
to in￿ ation.
To see how the oil share a⁄ects the in￿ ation￿ output gap trade-o⁄, notice
that a policy of strict price stability (￿t = 0) implies










In both cases, the extent to which stabilizing one variable induces ine¢ cient
￿ uctuations in the other is a function of the oil share. Finally, the oil share
a⁄ects the elasticity of demand for OPEC￿ s oil and thus the volatility of the oil
price markup itself.
8Strictly speaking, stronger reaction to the output gap would result in better alignment of
output with its e¢ cient level, which need not imply smaller volatility of the growth rate of
output, especially if real shocks are large.
95 Data and Methodology
We assess the extent to which the macroeconomic moderation in the United
States can be accounted for by changes in oil shocks and the oil share by per-
forming counterfactual simulations based on Bayesian estimation of the model of
Nakov and Pescatori (2007) for the periods pre- and post-1984. Our estimation
methodology is similar to Smets and Wouters (2003), Gali and Rabanal (2005),
and An and Shorfheide (2005). The observable variables (the moderation of
which we want to explain) are US GDP growth, in￿ ation, the nominal interest
rate, and the percentage change of the real price of oil. Quarterly data on real
GDP, the GDP de￿ ator, the federal funds rate and the West Texas Intermedi-
ate oil price from 1965:I to 2006:IV are taken from FRED II.9 GDP growth and
in￿ ation are computed as quarterly percentage changes of real GDP and the
GDP de￿ ator10; the nominal interest rate is converted to quarterly frequency
to render it consistent with the model; and the oil price is detrended by the
GDP de￿ ator and cast in quarterly percentage changes. The resulting series are
demeaned by their subsample means prior to estimation.
Since our model is meant to describe the behavior of OPEC, we start the
sample in 1965, which marks the year in which OPEC based its secretariat
in Vienna. Before that the international oil industry was dominated by seven
major oil companies of Anglo-Saxon origin, known as the ￿Seven Sisters.￿ Of
these, ￿ve belonged to the US (Esso, Mobil, Chevron, Texaco, and Gulf), one
to the UK (BP), and one was Anglo-Dutch (Shell). Even though OPEC was
created in 1960, in the ￿rst few years of its existence its activities were of a
low-pro￿le nature, as it set out its objectives, established a secretariat, and
engaged in negotiations with the oil companies.11 Thus, throughout the period
1959￿ 1964 the nominal oil price remained unchanged at just below 3$ a barrel.
The sample is split in 1984:I. This corresponds to the break in US output
volatility estimated by McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Cecchetti et al.
(2006), and others. A break in in￿ ation volatility was found around that date
as well (Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-Quiros, 2002); a break in the oil￿ GDP link
(Hooker, 1999) and the oil￿ in￿ ation relationship (Hooker, 2002) was identi￿ed
around 1981; and a break in the conduct of monetary policy around 1979￿ 1982
(Gali and Gertler, 2000).
We ￿x several parameters of the model based on historical averages over
the full sample (as in the case of the time discount factor), or on values which
are standard in the literature (as with the elasticity of substitution among ￿nal
goods). These calibrated parameter values are given in table 2 below.
The elasticity of oil in production is calibrated separately for each subsample
based on the average nominal expenditure on oil as a share of nominal GDP,
9The original series names are GDPC96, GDPDEF, FEDFUNDS, and OILPRICE.






(barrels of oil consumed in the US)t x ($ per barrel)t
(nominal GDP)t
; (19)
where t runs from 1965 to 1983 in the ￿rst sample and from 1984 to 2006 in the
second. This yields a value of 0.036 for the ￿rst period and 0.022 for the second,
which we ￿x prior to estimation.12 The reason we choose to calibrate the oil
share in this way rather than letting the estimation procedure tell us about its
distribution is that we do not expect the variables we use in the estimation to
be informative about this parameter. Instead, we use a formula for the oil share
which is consistent with our model, and for which we have accurate data.
Quarterly discount factor ￿ 0.9926 Avg. annual real rate 3%
Steady-state markup ￿ 1.15 Avg. markup 15%
Mean of non-OPEC capacity ￿ ￿ 0.004925 OPEC market share 40%
In￿ ation target ￿ ￿ 1 Optimal long-run in￿ ation
Capital share ￿2 0.33 Avg. capital income share
Oil share, 1965￿ 1983 so 0.036 Avg. oil income share
Oil share, 1984￿ 2006 so 0.022
Table 2. Calibrated parameters
The above procedure leaves us with fourteen parameters to estimate: the
frequency of price adjustment (￿), the Frisch labor supply elasticity ( ), the
parameters of the monetary policy rule (￿i; ￿￿; ￿y), the shocks￿autoregressive
parameters (￿a; ￿b; ￿z; ￿!), and standard deviations of the innovations (￿a; ￿b;
￿z; ￿!; ￿r).
We approximate our model to ￿rst-order and solve it with a standard method
for linear rational expectations models (e.g., Sims, 2002, and Klein, 2000). Given
the state-space representation, we use the Kalman ￿lter to evaluate the likeli-
hood of the four observable variables. From Bayes￿ s rule, the posterior density
function is proportional to the product of the likelihood and the prior density of
the parameters. We use a random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to obtain
5 chains of 50000 draws from the posterior distribution. We choose a scale for
the jumping distribution in the MH algorithm which yields an acceptance rate
of around 30%. The posterior distributions are obtained by discarding the ￿rst
half of the draws from each chain.
Once we obtain the estimates for each sample period, we perform counter-
factual simulations, isolating the e⁄ect of a change in a single factor (e.g., the
oil share) on the volatility moderation.
12We do this by setting the share of labor to 0.634 in the ￿rst sample and 0.648 in the
second, while keeping the share of capital ￿xed at 0.33.
116 Priors and Estimation Results
6.1 Choice of priors
The ￿rst four columns of tables 3a and 3b show the assumed prior densities
for the parameters whose posterior distributions we want to characterize. We
use the same prior densities for each parameter in both samples, except for
the parameter on in￿ ation in the monetary policy rule. For this parameter we
assume a normal (1.5, 0.5) distribution in the second sample, but a gamma prior
with mean 1.1 and a standard deviation of 0.5 in the ￿rst sample. Following
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Justiniano and Primiceri (2007), this assigns
roughly equal probability on the in￿ ation coe¢ cient being either less or greater
than one, while restricting it to be positive.13
We should stress that the conditions for local determinacy of equilibria in
our model are not the standard ones. In particular, ￿￿ > 1 is not a necessary
condition for local uniqueness, and indeed there is a large region of determinacy
for values of ￿￿ su¢ ciently below 1 (see Figure 4). The reason is that, in contrast
to the standard three-equation New Keynesian framework, in our model the
Phillips curve includes an additional term ￿ the oil price markup ￿ which
responds (optimally) to other endogenous variables, and in particular to the
past output gap. This explains why we can solve and estimate our model for
values of ￿￿ below 1.
For the other parameters of the monetary policy rule we use normal prior
densities in both samples. For the price adjustment probability we assume a
beta prior with mean 0.75 and standard deviation of 0.1. For the inverse Frisch
labor supply elasticity we assume a gamma prior with mean 1 and standard
deviation of 0.25.14 The autocorrelation coe¢ cients of the shocks are assumed
to be beta with mean 0.9 and standard deviation of 0.05. And for the standard
deviation of the innovations we assume an inverted gamma distribution (which
ensures nonnegativity) and use prior information from the calibrated model in
Nakov and Pescatori (2007) to specify the mean.
6.2 Estimation results
Comparing the two sets of estimated posterior modes in tables 3a and 3b we
notice several important parameter shifts. First, the mode of the in￿ ation co-
e¢ cient of the monetary policy rule is larger in the second sample, implying
that monetary policy was reacting more strongly to in￿ ation than in the ￿rst
period. At the same time, the estimated standard deviation of the interest rate
innovation in the pre-1984 sample is more than double that in the post-1984
sample, suggesting that policy was more erratic in the ￿rst period.
13The estimation results turn out to be almost identical if instead we assume the same
normal prior density for the coe¢ cient on in￿ation in both samples.
14We base our estimation on the full model, in which the Frisch labor supply elasticity
enters in several equations independently from the Calvo parameter. Hence, we are able to
identify these two parameters separately, not like in the simple three-equation New Keynesian
model.
12Second, the mode of the Calvo parameter governing the frequency of price
adjustment is smaller in the post-1984 period, suggesting that prices have be-
come more ￿ exible.
Third, there is evidence of changes in the volatility (and persistence) of real
shocks. In particular, the volatility of the US technology innovation was cut by
half in the post-1984 period, while preference shocks became more persistent.
Finally, oil sector shocks (especially oil technology shocks) became smaller in
the latter period.
Para- Prior distribution Posterior distribution
meter Density and domain Mean Std Mean Std Mode
￿ Beta [0;1) 0.75 0.100 0.649 0.076 0.627
  Gamma R+ 1.00 0.250 1.097 0.397 0.901
￿i Normal R 0.60 0.100 0.557 0.075 0.543
￿￿ Gamma R+ 1.10 0.500 1.887 0.292 2.096
￿y Normal R 0.50 0.125 0.596 0.105 0.586
￿a Beta [0;1) 0.90 0.050 0.957 0.015 0.974
￿b Beta [0;1) 0.90 0.050 0.883 0.035 0.894
￿z Beta [0;1) 0.90 0.050 0.933 0.026 0.940
￿! Beta [0;1) 0.90 0.050 0.931 0.024 0.947
100￿a Inv. Gamma R+ 0.70 1 1.220 0.098 1.180
100￿b Inv. Gamma R+ 0.70 1 2.170 0.480 1.900
100￿z Inv. Gamma R+ 10.0 1 18.27 1.870 18.59
100￿! Inv. Gamma R+ 10.0 1 31.74 5.300 28.64
100￿r Inv. Gamma R+ 0.10 1 0.430 0.053 0.430
Table 3a. Prior and posterior distributions, 1965￿ 1983
Table 4 shows that the estimated model does quite a good job at matching
the second moments and the post-1984 volatility reduction of the variables of
interest. To be precise, the model slightly overestimates the volatility of GDP
growth and in￿ ation in both periods but matches quite well the post-1984 re-
duction in volatility of these variables. The moderation of the nominal interest
rate is somewhat overestimated, but the volatility and moderation of the oil
price is matched pretty well.
13Para- Prior distribution Posterior distribution
meter Density and domain Mean Std Mean Std Mode
￿ Beta [0;1) 0.75 0.100 0.529 0.067 0.543
  Gamma R+ 1.00 0.250 1.328 0.405 1.248
￿i Normal R 0.60 0.100 0.684 0.057 0.704
￿￿ Normal R 1.50 0.500 3.115 0.290 3.012
￿y Normal R 0.50 0.125 0.549 0.101 0.572
￿a Beta [0;1) 0.90 0.050 0.978 0.009 0.984
￿b Beta [0;1) 0.90 0.050 0.950 0.015 0.950
￿z Beta [0;1) 0.90 0.050 0.870 0.040 0.867
￿! Beta [0;1) 0.90 0.050 0.948 0.021 0.955
100￿a Inv. Gamma R+ 0.70 1 0.595 0.044 0.590
100￿b Inv. Gamma R+ 0.70 1 2.108 0.512 1.880
100￿z Inv. Gamma R+ 10.0 1 13.70 1.708 14.45
100￿! Inv. Gamma R+ 10.0 1 28.70 5.134 25.63
100￿r Inv. Gamma R+ 0.10 1 0.226 0.033 0.200
Table 3b. Prior and posterior distributions, 1984￿ 2006
1965￿ 1983 1984￿ 2006 Volat. reduction
Data Model Data Model Data Model
GDP growth 1.126 1.381 0.508 0.669 55% 52%
In￿ ation 0.609 0.658 0.244 0.279 60% 58%
Interest rate 0.847 0.860 0.583 0.455 31% 47%
Real oil price 16.32 15.71 12.99 12.92 20% 18%
Table 4. Second moments of model and data
7 Implications
7.1 What accounts for the Moderation?
In this section we attribute the volatility reduction implied by the model (the
last column of Table 4) to counterfactual changes in each factor in isolation,
including: (1) the oil share; (2) monetary policy; (3) real shocks, including oil
sector shocks and US shocks; (4) a shift in the frequency of price adjustment
or (5) in the Frisch labor supply elasticity; and (6) the residual due to the
interaction of all factors (this is just to say that the contributions of factors 1
to 5 are not linearly additive and do not sum up exactly to 100%).
Table 5a presents the percentage reduction in volatility that would be achieved
by a change in any single factor keeping the rest of the parameters at their pre-
1984 values.15 Thus, had the oil share in the period 1965￿ 1983 been at its
15We do not model transition dynamics here; Canova and Gambetti (2007) propose an
14post-1984 value (that is, 0.022 instead of 0.036), GDP growth would have been
6.5% less volatile, the nominal interest rate 10.7% less volatile, and in￿ ation
23% less volatile, while the oil price would have been 0.4% more volatile. Ex-
pressed in percent of the actual reduction in the volatility of these variables
(reproduced in the last column), the change in the oil share alone could explain
around one-tenth of the GDP growth moderation, one-quarter of the interest
rate moderation, and one-third of the in￿ ation moderation. This points to the
oil share decline having played a considerable role in the moderation, especially
of in￿ ation.
By the same token, better monetary policy (meaning both better systematic
reaction and smaller monetary shocks) could explain about two-thirds of the
in￿ ation moderation, one-half of the interest rate moderation, but only 5% of
the GDP growth moderation. And smaller real shocks explain around three-
quarters of the GDP growth moderation, one-quarter of in￿ ation moderation,
and one-third of the interest rate moderation. Smaller oil shocks in particular
account for 7% of GDP growth moderation, 11% of in￿ ation moderation, and
all of the oil price moderation.
Table 5b shows that around two-thirds of the GDP growth moderation can
be accounted for by smaller TFP shocks alone, while smaller time preference
shocks account for around one-tenth of the in￿ ation moderation and a quarter
of the interest rate moderation. Interestingly, smaller oil technology shocks were
responsible for the bulk of the oil price moderation, with fringe (or cartelization)
shocks playing a smaller role.
Our ￿ndings ascribe to monetary policy quite a modest role in the modera-
tion of GDP growth . This could be for several reasons. One is the proximity
of our simple model to the RBC paradigm: apart from nominal price rigidities
(with a Calvo parameter estimated at 0.63 in the ￿rst period) and imperfect
competition in oil, our model features no other imperfections or real rigidities
(e.g., as in Blanchard and Gali, 2007) that would raise the relative importance
of the interest rate channel. Second, we assume that the central bank reacts to
the output gap (and not to output growth), which in our model is a relevant tar-
get variable for a central bank concerned with the welfare of the representative
household. Given this rule, better monetary policy does not necessarily im-
ply smaller output ￿ uctuations, especially if real disturbances are large. Third,
the estimated reaction to the output gap is not much di⁄erent across the two
samples (it is the reaction to in￿ ation, which increases substantially in the sec-
ond period), so even if the ￿ uctuations of e¢ cient output were not large, the
post-1984 rule would not have stabilized output much better than the pre-1984
one.
The bottom line of this analysis is that the reduced oil share and smaller oil
alternative method of performing counterfactual simulations based on re-estimating all the
model￿ s parameters conditional on the chosen counterfactual value for any given parameter.
Essentially this amounts to treating all model parameters as reduced-form rather than deep
behavioral parameters independent of the experiment. While this can be a useful alternative
methodology, we stick to the more standard approach of Stock and Watson (2003), treating
our parameters as behavioral.
15shocks have played a nontrivial role in the volatility reduction even if the other
two factors ￿ smaller TFP shocks and better monetary policy ￿ have played
the dominant role for the moderation of GDP and in￿ ation, respectively.
Oil Monet. Real shocks Calvo Frisch All
share policy Oil US All param elast. factors
GDP growth 6.49 2.29 3.40 34.9 40.3 1.07 0.37 52
In￿ ation 23.0 40.2 6.06 6.43 13.0 -6.89 -2.28 58
Interest rate 10.7 26.5 1.22 15.8 17.3 -1.98 -0.71 47
Real oil price -0.42 0.01 17.9 0.02 18.0 0.05 0.01 18
Table 5a. Percent moderation by factor16
Real shock All
^ a ^ b ^ z ^ ! factors
GDP growth 34.1 0.54 3.13 0.27 52
In￿ ation 0.88 5.50 4.64 1.37 58
Interest rate 2.98 12.4 0.52 0.70 47
Real oil price 0.02 0.00 14.8 2.65 18
Table 5b. Percent moderation by shock
7.2 Changes in the Phillips curve
Hooker (2002) ￿nds evidence of a break in standard (backward-looking) core US
in￿ ation Phillips curves regressions, with oil price changes making a substantial
contribution to core in￿ ation before 1981 but having little or no pass-through
since that time. Similarly, estimating the standard New Keynesian model via
maximum likelihood, Ireland (2004) ￿nds that ￿cost-push￿shocks have become
smaller since the 1980s.
Our model, estimated with Bayesian techniques, is in broad agreement with
these claims. Indeed, it points to the decrease in the oil share as a likely cause
of the improvement in the Phillips curve trade-o⁄ as in￿ ation and the output
gap have become more aligned with each other and less sensitive to oil price
￿ uctuations. In particular, the last column of Table 6 shows that conditional on
a 40% reduction of the oil share from 3.6% to 2.2% (and keeping all other factors
unchanged), the volatility of the output gap is reduced by around 40% (as is
the instantaneous pass-through from the cost-push term to in￿ ation), resulting
in a 23% decline in the volatility of in￿ ation.
16The numbers indicate by how much the volatility of a (row) variable would have been
reduced by a change in a single (column) factor. A negative sign means that the factor alone
would have raised volatility post-1984
16In addition, thanks mostly to smaller oil shocks, the volatility of the oil
price markup itself has decreased by around 15% in the period after 1984. This,
together with increased price ￿ exibility (in the form of higher ￿) since the mid-
1980s and a stronger transmission channel, has made it possible for monetary
policy to stabilize better both the output gap (see row 7 of Table 6) and in￿ ation.
1965￿ 1983 1984￿ 2006 Counterf so
Oil share so 0.036 0.022 0.022
Common slope coe⁄. ￿ 0.643 1.337 0.641
Oil markup pass-through so￿ 0.023 0.029 0.014
Output gap coe¢ cient (1 ￿ so)￿ 0.620 1.312 0.627
Oil markup volatility std(^ ￿t) 29.35 25.08 28.77
Oil markup persistence ￿(^ ￿t) 0.946 0.947 0.946
Output gap volatility std(^ yt) 1.072 0.562 0.678
Output gap persistence ￿(^ yt) 0.902 0.925 0.817
Table 6. Changes in the Phillips curve
7.3 Changes in the relative importance of shocks
Tables 7a and 7b show the asymptotic variance decomposition of the four vari-
ables of interest in the ￿rst and second samples.17
Notably, the last two columns of both tables reveal that the contribution of
oil sector shocks to US GDP growth and in￿ ation variability has been consider-
able, both before and after 1984. In particular, oil shocks (^ z and ^ !) contributed
to around 17% of GDP growth volatility, and as much as 60% of in￿ ation volatil-
ity and 32% of interest rate volatility in the period 1965￿ 1983. Thereafter, oil
shocks continued to account for around 17% of growth volatility but were re-
sponsible for ￿only￿33% percent of in￿ ation volatility and 14% of interest rate
volatility. Interestingly, the shock to oil productivity turns out to be more im-
portant for GDP growth and oil price volatility, while the fringe shock is more
relevant for the volatility of in￿ ation and the interest rate.
17This is obtained by solving the equation ￿y = A￿yA0 +B￿uB0 in ￿y, the unconditional
variance of y; where yt is the solution to the linear rational expectations model of the form
yt = Ayt￿1 + But. It is thus the decomposition of the unconditional variance of endogenous
variables, given that shocks occur in every period from today to in￿nity.
17US shocks Oil shocks
Real Nom.
^ a ^ b ^ r ^ z ^ !
GDP growth 75.6 1.38 5.76 14.4 2.84
In￿ ation 1.95 24.4 10.4 9.86 53.4
Interest rate 6.77 57.5 3.77 1.34 30.6
Real oil price 0.04 0.01 0.04 74.0 25.9
Table 7a. Variance decomposition, 1965￿ 1983
Turning to US-originating disturbances, the shock to TFP (^ a), which ac-
counts for the bulk of GDP growth volatility before 1984, has become even
more important for GDP growth, but has decreased its impact on in￿ ation, the
interest rate, and the oil price after that year. The preference shock (^ b) was im-
portant for in￿ ation and the nominal interest rate before 1984 and has become
even more relevant for these variables, but less important for GDP growth, in
the more recent sample; and the interest rate shock (^ r) has increased its relative
importance for in￿ ation but has become less relevant for GDP, the interest rate,
and the oil price.
US shocks Oil shocks
Real Nom.
^ a ^ b ^ r ^ z ^ !
GDP growth 79.0 0.76 3.53 12.3 4.39
In￿ ation 0.60 33.1 32.8 0.55 32.9
Interest rate 2.59 82.1 1.41 0.76 13.2
Real oil price 0.02 0.00 0.01 70.0 30.0
Table 7b. Variance decomposition, 1984 ￿2006
Finally, Figure 5 shows the imputed series for the structural innovations
based on the more recent sample period. The shocks are signed so that a
positive value is associated with an increase in the oil price. Interestingly, the
￿gure suggests that the recent oil price increases (starting after the Asian crisis
and interrupted temporarily around the recession of 2001), are re￿ ecting to a
greater extent ￿fringe￿shocks (that is, reduced availability of oil outside OPEC￿ s
control) rather than increases in the marginal cost of oil production.
8 Comparison of the Results with the Literature
Based on a calibrated model with an exogenous oil supply, Leduc and Sill (2007)
conclude that improved monetary policy can account for 45% of the decline in
18in￿ ation volatility but only 5% to 10% of the reduction in output volatility, the
bulk of which can be explained by smaller TFP shocks. In this regard, our
￿ndings are similar to theirs: we ￿nd that better policy can explain around
two-thirds of the in￿ ation moderation but only around 5% of the GDP growth
moderation. However, our results are distinct when it comes to attributing the
Great Moderation to oil shocks. While we ￿nd that smaller oil-sector shocks
have contributed to 7% of the GDP growth moderation and 11% of the in￿ ation
moderation, Leduc and Sill claim that oil shocks became larger after 1984 and
hence led to rising volatility. This discrepancy is likely due to the di⁄erent way
in which Leduc and Sill identify oil shocks, namely, by treating the oil supply
as constant except for four episodes of military con￿ ict, with larger average
production drops after 1984. This contrasts with our modeling of the oil -sector
as the dominant player with competitive fringe, and identifying oil shocks as
disturbances to oil productivity or fringe capacity. In addition, we ￿nd that
reduced oil share can explain about one-third of the in￿ ation moderation and
13% of the GDP growth moderation, a question which is not addressed by Leduc
and Sill.
Gali and Blanchard (2007) introduce real wage rigidities to generate an
in￿ ation￿ output gap trade-o⁄. They demonstrate how a reduction in oil￿ s share
of consumption and production shifts inward the policy frontier and goes some
way towards explaining the observed reduction in in￿ ation and output volatility.
Our model, in comparison, generates a policy trade-o⁄ by assuming imperfect
competition in the oil market while ignoring real wage rigidities. We also at-
tempt to quantify more precisely the contribution of each factor by estimating
the model with Bayesian techniques and performing counterfactual simulations.
Canova (2007) investigates the causes of output and in￿ ation moderation
in the US by estimating the benchmark small-scale New Keynesian model with
Bayesian techniques over rolling samples. He ￿nds instability in the posterior
of the parameters that describe private sector behavior, the coe¢ cients of the
policy rule, and the covariance structure of shocks. Canova further shows that
even though changes in the parameters of the private sector are largest, they
cannot account by themselves for the full decline in the volatility of output and
in￿ ation, while changes in the parameters of the policy rule and the covariance
of the shocks can. Our ￿ndings are similar to Canova in that the bulk of GDP
growth moderation is attributed to changes in real shocks, while most of the
in￿ ation moderation is due to monetary policy. Yet we ￿nd that as much as
one-third of the in￿ ation moderation and 13% of the moderation of output is
attributable to the smaller share of oil in GDP, which is not directly measurable
in the benchmark New Keynesian model estimated by Canova.
Gali and Gambetti (2007) look for the sources of the Great Moderation using
a VAR with time-varying coe¢ cients and stochastic volatility. Their ￿ndings
point to structural change, as opposed to just good luck, as an explanation. In
particular, they show that a signi￿cant fraction of the observed changes in co-
movements and impulse-responses can be accounted for by a stronger reaction
of monetary policy to in￿ ation, and an apparent end of short-run increasing
returns to labor. On the other hand, using a VAR with time-varying coe¢ -
19cients identi￿ed through sign restrictions, Canova and Gambetti (2007) ￿nd no
evidence that there was an increase in the response of the interest rate to in-
￿ ation, and overall conclude that monetary policy was marginally responsible
for the Great Moderation. Indeed, recent work by Benati and Surico (2007)
casts doubt on the ability of VARs to distinguish between the ￿good policy￿
and ￿good luck￿explanations for the Great Moderation.
Compared with these studies, our counterfactual analysis, based on esti-
mation of a structural model, assigns an important role to monetary policy,
especially in the moderation of in￿ ation (and the nominal interest rate). At
the same time, we point to the nontrivial role played by oil, especially in the
moderation of in￿ ation and in the improvement of the in￿ ation￿ output gap
trade-o⁄.
9 Conclusions
We assess the extent to which increased macroeconomic stability in the US after
1984 can be accounted for by changes in oil shocks and the oil share, by taking
the model of Nakov and Pescatori (2007) to the data with Bayesian techniques
and performing counterfactual simulations. In doing so we nest two popular
explanations for the Great Moderation, namely, smaller non-oil shocks, and
better monetary policy.
Our estimates indicate that oil played a nontrivial role in the volatility
decline. In particular, the reduced oil share alone can explain around one -
third of the in￿ ation moderation and 13% of the GDP growth moderation.
Smaller oil-sector shocks account for 7% of the growth moderation and 11% of
the in￿ ation moderation. At the same time, we ￿nd that smaller TFP shocks
can explain about two-thirds of the growth moderation, while better monetary
policy alone can explain about two-thirds of the in￿ ation moderation.
2010 Appendix
10.1 Model equations






t log[potOt ￿ Ot=Zt]; (20)
subject to the constraints imposed by the optimal behavior of the competitive
fringe
Xt = pot￿tZt (21)
















































pot = somctQt￿t=(Ot + Xt) (28)






t ￿ K￿2 (Ot + Xt)
so ; (30)


















and the global resource constraint
Ct = Yt = Qt ￿ pot (Ot + Xt): (32)
We assume that OPEC can commit to the optimal policy rule that brings
about the equilibrium, which maximizes expression (20) above. Furthermore,
we restrict our attention to Markovian stochastic processes for all exogenous
variables and to optimal decision rules which are time-invariant functions of the
state of the economy.
2110.2 First-order conditions














































0 = ￿1t + ￿3t^ bt + ￿4t￿mct^ bt + ￿7tsomct￿t ￿ ￿8t￿mct￿t ￿ ￿9t￿t (35)
0 = ￿3t￿1￿Ct￿1￿
￿￿1



































































￿ ￿6t + ￿7tsomctQt ￿ ￿8t￿1mctQt ￿ ￿9tQt (41)



























0 = ￿8tLt ￿ ￿10t (44)
The set of equations (21) to (44), together with the laws of motion of the
exogenous states (3), (4), (5), and (16), constitute a full description of the model.
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Figure 4: Instability (dark) and determinacy (white) regions of the model
27Figure 5: Imputed structural innovations, 1984-2006
28